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Abstract
As society becomes digitalized, online social
networks tend to be primary places for debate but
can turn into a battlefield for imposing conflicting
narratives. Automating the identification of online
conflicts is a challenge due to difficulties in defining
antagonist communities and controversial discussions.
Here, we propose a polarization approach for
understanding Twitter conflicts in Brazil during the
COVID-19 pandemic, where a small group of polarizers
influences a larger group of polarizees according to
their ideological leaning. Polarizers are automatically
identified by centrality metrics in following, retweet,
and reply networks and manually labeled as leftists,
rightists, or undefined. We collected and analyzed the
polarization of 21 potentially conflicted political events
in Brazil. Our results show that polarizers adequately
represent the polarization of events, the traditional
media is giving way to a new breed of tweeters, and
retweet and reply play different roles within a conflict
that reflects their polarization level.

1.

Introduction

Society is steadily becoming digital, where
computers, networks, algorithms, and data currently
mediate most interactions among people [1]. During
the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, digital communication
has significantly increased due to the need for social
distancing. Similarly, conflicts have been migrating to
the digital world, especially when physical interactions
are impossible or inconvenient. The process of high
polarization in social networks mediating the political
debate leads to social fragmentation and difficulty in
consensus building. The absence of well-established
information filters (gatekeepers) in social media in
a digital society plays a crucial role in magnifying
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conflicts. In polarized conflicts, the debate moves from
the field of political projects to a contentious moral
dispute, focusing on right vs. wrong, true vs. false, and
good vs. evil. Such minimum consensus is necessary
for policies to combat enormous societal threats such as
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Brazil is experiencing significant growth in the
number of Internet and social media users in the last
years, including more than 75% of the population in
2019 [2]. In such a society, the discussion moves
naturally to the online world, giving voice to the
otherwise unheard minorities. Social media has played
a vital role in the Brazilian political processes during
President Rousseff’s impeachment in 2015 and 2016,
and the election of president Bolsonaro in 2018 [3].
Polarization in the public political debate worsens
when a conflicted view of the world leads individuals
to align their beliefs in extreme positions [4], mostly
characterized by strong opinions frequently expressed
as uncivil language, scolding, exaggerations, denials of
acknowledged facts, or lies [5, 6]. Although loud and
visible, a relatively small group of activists frequently
leads the polarized discourse and influences other people
to follow them in increased conflicting situations in
social networks. In this paper, these activists are called
polarizers, also referred to as antagonists in the literature
[5].
Humans browsing a social network can quickly
identify opposite views, understand criticisms and
tensions, and characterize this situation as a conflict.
On the other hand, the automation of the understanding
and characterization of conflicts in social networks
is still a challenge due to inherent difficulties
in defining conflicting communities, controversial
discussion topics, and contrasting views, let alone
detecting figures of speech, irony, and sarcasm.
This paper proposes a polarization approach for
understanding online conflicts in social networks and
applies it in a multi-event case study during the 2020
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COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil. In this context, we
propose the following research question: RQ) How can
an online conflict be understood by the polarization
of users in online social networks?. For answering
this question, we developed a methodology where we:
collect Twitter data for potentially conflicting events
(Twitter stands out as an open and reliable platform [7]);
identify and label a small number of highly influential
users called polarizers that exert influence over a larger
group of polarizees; compute following, retweet and
reply polarization; automatically extend the polarizer
group, and finally; repolarize users. The process of
selecting polarizers is based on building retweet and
reply networks for the datasets and computing centrality
metrics. We applied this approach in 21 datasets
collected from Twitter based on events with greater
repercussions in Brazil during the 2020 pandemic, from
which we selected 147 polarizers.
Our results show that polarization metrics can be
successfully used to characterize online conflicts. The
group of polarizers, even small and receiving no more
than 30% of retweets and replies, adequately represents
the polarization of the event datasets. We confirmed
the polarizers’ representativeness by automatically
extending the polarizer group and repolarizing all
users, where we verified insignificant changes in the
polarization levels. The traditional media is losing its
prime time in mediating social media debates, giving
way to otherwise unknown tweeters and alternative
media websites. Furthermore, retweets have been
mostly used for reinforcing particular ideological views
within the so-called echo chambers, whereas replies are
the mechanisms used to exchange ideas among different
groups. The key contributions of this paper are:
1. The development of a new methodology for
understanding conflicts in online social networks,
based on a polarization approach that divides
users into two groups: polarizers and polarizees;
2. A validation of this methodology in the context of
the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic crisis in Brazil.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces related work and our research
approach is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the results obtained by employing our approach, while
Section 5 discusses our findings. Section 6 draws some
conclusions and provide some future lines of works.

2.

Related Work

Due to the digitization of societies, digital
communication has been considered for several
application domains. For instance, Chen & Du [8]

used data gathered from a stock forum in China, called
Guba.com.cn, to predict the trading volume and
stock prices, whereas Meske et al. [9] examined the
usefulness of social network within organizational
settings and how it improved the digital work in terms
of knowledge sharing and engagement.
Furthermore, a growing line of studies analyze
debates on online social networks as they would have
a massive impact on public opinions. Through the
analysis of Twitter data, [10] indicated that members of
higher social hierarchies play a central role in the public
debate as they receive most of the cross-ideological
mentions; the general public was mostly ignored.
Apart from that, 40% of cross-ideological tweets
were disagreement, which shows that Twitter might
be contributing to increasing the contradictory debate
within societies. While, Primario et al. [11] examined
the polarization on the 2016 US Presidential Debates
in Twitter and argued on a reasonable similarity
of virtual and face-to-face debates as in both cases
follow the so-called U-Shape pattern, i.e., contradictory
discussions start in high-levels of debate, decrease over
time, and rise when reaching the end of argumentation.
They also showed that the polarization also increases
from a debate to another throughout the Presidential
campaign, which reinforces the similarity behavior on
virtual and face-to-face debates. On the other hand,
Stewart et al. [12] suggested close attention to trolls, i.e.,
automated Twitter accounts with substantial influence
on increasing the polarization of online conflicts and
thus accentuating disagreements, even though evidence
of benign bots has also been found[13].
Different means of social interaction within Twitter
have been used to analyze and characterize the online
social conflicts. In particular, retweeting has been
concisely adopted as a proxy for influence and thus can
be used to indicate polarization. For instance, Liu et al.
[14] demonstrated that the communication patterns (e.g.,
retweet network) have a significant potential to identify
the users’ ideological leaning within a conflict. This fact
was further explored by Morales et al. [4] that measured
the political polarization by propagating the opinion of
elite users (i.e., users with high-levels of popularity) to
listeners (i.e., influenced users). Hong et al. [15] showed
that politicians with extreme political ideologies have
more Twitter followers than their moderate peers. In
contrast, Gruzd et al. [16] suggested that even though
Twitter increases the shared views, some cross-party
debate among supporters of similar leaning parties were
noticed.
Content analysis on reply discourse is another
approach for understanding and measuring the virtual
conflicts; therefore, the communication language
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analysis might be suitable to indicate a particular level
of polarization. Gruzd et al. [16] found evidence
that interactions of distant ideological supporters - or
antagonists [5] - are negative and hostage in nature,
which ultimately would lead to a more polarized
discussion. Hong [15] further recognized that online
messages with radical views are more likely to be
noticed and disseminated. All these hostile interactions
are increasing due to the so-called echo chambers, i.e.,
users are exposed only to communities and users that
support their views [16, 17, 18]. In contrast, Garimella
et al. [19] measured the conflict as a controversy
indicator on Twitter by building a conversation graph
from the Tweets hashtags and showed that retweet
and follow graphs, as well as a random walk, edge
betweenness, and sentiment analysis measures were
more effective when measuring controversies.
Even though previous work has addressed relevant
and vital issues, this area still has many open research
questions, such as using metrics from social media
analytics that may improve the understanding of online
conflicts. Metrics are essential to determine how much
polarization there is in the ongoing discussions and
perceive the phenomenon over a specified period.

3.

Research Approach

This section first introduces our research approach,
including the basic concepts and later presents the steps
to carry out the experimental design, starting from data
collection up to the analysis of results.

3.1.

polarizers, and polarizees, where seed users are initially
selected as candidates for polarizers. A process of
repolarization extends the initial group of polarizers
into a larger one. Polarizers influence other users,
i.e. the polarizee, when they post particularly polarized
tweets. In response to polarized tweets, polarizees
follow, retweet, and reply the polarizes, which indicates
their level of polarization.

Figure 1: Basic concepts of Online Conflicts

3.2.

Research Methodology

We developed a new methodology to characterize
online conflicts from the user polarization, consisting
of six major steps, as shown graphically in Figure
2. While we adopted existing concepts from the
literature, we developed the whole sequence of steps,
and also, the repolarization approach from step 6
is our original contribution. Here, we describe our
general methodology and its usage for analyzing typical
conflicts in Brazilian politics.

Basic concepts

We adopt existing concepts used in related work seed users and polarization - as well as consolidate new
ones, such as polarizer, polarizee, and repolarization.
Seed users belong to the original user set to measure
polarization, selected by building retweet and reply
networks and computing centrality metrics. Polarizer
specialize and extend seed users, influencing other users
in the choice of retweeting and replying. Throughout
this paper, the term polarizer is used to indicate what
otherwise may be known as seed user. Polarizee is a
common user influenced by polarizers in their retweet
and reply behavior. Polarization indicates the level of
how polarized a conflicted event is in terms of frequency
of retweets and replies to polarizers whose political
leaning is known (left/wright/undefined). Also, it means
the level of how polarized are individual polarizees.
Repolarization is a process of extending the initial
polarizers by automatically labeling user leaning based
on their polarization level.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship among seed users,

Figure 2: Research Methodology
Step 1: Collect Twitter data of potential conflicted
events into different datasets. The Twitter Streaming
API is the default data collection approach that returns
meaningful datasets [7]. We developed a crawler that
collects data matching specific hashtags chosen by 21
events with a higher impact on the news during the
first semester of 2020 on the ongoing context of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Step 2: Identify first polarizers based on centrality
metrics in interaction networks. First, for each dataset,
build two directed interaction graphs (networks), where
users are the vertices (nodes), and retweets and replies
are the edges (links). Specifically, if user A retweets or
replies to user B, a directed edge is created from user A
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to user B. Second, compute degree, indegree, outdegree,
betweenness, and PageRank centrality metrics to
identify the most influential users. Third, generate lists
with the top 100 users for each dataset, interaction
(retweet/reply), and centrality metric. Fourth, count
the number of times each user appeared in the top 100
lists for retweet and reply networks separately and rank
the 100 top users for the retweet and reply interactions.
Finally, merge the retweet and reply top 100 lists to form
a unique list of polarizers. We applied this step on 21
datasets, resulting in 42 networks (21 retweet and 21
reply ones) and 210 centrality lists. We tried different
alternatives for computing the top polarizers, but this
one showed itself to be more robust in terms of the
group of polarizers it selects. Also, by using different
centrality metrics, we captured users who play different
roles in the network. For example, degree, indegree,
outdegree, and PageRank centrality metrics capture the
user’s importance regarding the number of retweets and
replies he/she sent and received. On the other hand,
betweenness centrality capture users who intermediate
the interaction among other users. Electing influential
users to define the polarization is a common practice in
this area, where they receive different names, such as
antagonists [5], elite users [4], or seed users [20].
Step 3: Manually label polarizers into left, wright,
and undefined political leaning. Each unique polarizer
selected in Step 2 must be individually labeled according
to their activity on Twitter. For example, we labeled
politicians according to their parties and personal
ideology.
Also, traditional media and traditional
journalists were classified as undefined since they
usually report a fact with less ideology interference.
On the other hand, some otherwise relatively unknown
users outside Twitter required an in-depth analysis of
their original tweets, retweets, and replies according to
their political leaning. These users are also classified
into nine categories, which did not directly interfere in
the polarization analysis but helped us understand our
polarizers in terms of their ideology and activity.
Step 4: Collect following relationship: polarizee →
polarizer. After selecting and labeling the polarizers,
use the Twitter Streaming API to collect data and
establish the following → follower network. Rather than
collecting all polarizers’ followers, we collected their
following users who retweeted or replied ten times or
more. The sum of polarizers’ followers is almost 120
million users, whereas we collected around 40 million
users in around 200 hours, respecting the API limits.
Step 5: Compute following, retweet, and reply
polarization, using the Garimella and Weber [20]
approach based on the Bayesian probability, which
provides a way to update our beliefs in the evidence

of new data. The decision of following, retweeting,
and replying may be considered a Bernoulli trial whose
repetition leads to the Binomial distribution. The
conjugate prior to the Binomial is the Beta distribution
with two parameters α and β with the mean by α/(α+β).
We used the Beta distribution with initial uniform prior,
i.e., α = β = 1, where α represents left-leaning and
β represents right-leaning. Therefore, for computing
the three polarization metrics (following, retweet, and
reply), increase the count of α or β every time a
polarizee followed, retweeted, and replied a polarizer for
each dataset. This process renders different means for
different datasets since different sets of polarizers and
polarizees participate in the events. Polarizers labeled
as undefined do not change the polarization metric. The
l metric reflects the political ”leaning.” When l is 0.5,
polarizees have a null polarization, as they have the same
number of counts to α and β. When l tends to 1, the
user is highly polarized to the left and highly polarized
to the right when l tends to zero. To unify left and right
polarization under a single metric, compute polarization
p = 2 . |0.5 − l|, where p = 0 means l = 0.5 that
means no polarization whatsoever. On the other hand,
as p tends to 1 (it will never be 1 actually), it means
that the polarizee is more polarized either to the left or
right. We then compute the average of all polarizees p
values for each dataset, which we call retweet, reply, and
following polarization.
Step 6: Repolarize users. This step extends the
original set of polarizers by a repolarization approach
that automatically labels polarizees with p ≥ δ according
to their political leaning. After the first automated
repolarization process, the polarization is recomputed
for adding more retweets and replies. This process
(automated 1) can be extended to n iterations (automated
n), where the repolarization only stops when there
is no increment in the number of polarizers between
current and previous iterations. We tested different
repolarization thresholds, and δ =0.7 showed to be
adequate to our needs. Thus, polarizees with l ≤ 0.15
are labeled right, and p ≥ 0.85 are labeled left.

4.
4.1.

Results
Datasets

As explained in Step 1 of our methodology, we
collected data related to potential conflicting events
in the Brazilian political scenario during the 2020
pandemic, from which 21 datasets were considered
adequate in terms of polarization to be individually
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analyzed. Table 1 presents the selected datasets1 along
with some statistics of the number of users participating
in the debate, number of retweets, and number of replies.
Table 1: Twitter Datasets

worked with 147 users. Since 21 polarizers were labeled
as undefined (i.e., neutral leaning), the polarization
approach considered in practice 126 polarizers, 99
rightists, and 27 leftists, i.e., a predominance of the
right-wing in the current political debate in Twitter.
Table 2 depicts some numbers resulting from the
labeling and classification processes. Some categories
are self-explanatory, such as journalists, politicians,
traditional media, and artist/athlete. Institution includes
the Brazilian Supreme Count and Senate official Twitter
accounts. Alternative media include highly biased
websites that support one side of the political spectrum.
Traditional media accounts are classified as undefined
since they do not explicitly support either side.
Table 2: Polarizer distribution: categories and leaning

Each dataset, represented by a nickname and the
data collection date, was classified into four categories
of conflicts. Pandemic refers to datasets with direct
involvement in the spread of the coronavirus, speeches
of the Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, repercussions
about the use of chloroquine for treating COVID-19,
as well as struggles involving the Brazilian Ministry
of Health. Political controversy may also relate to
the pandemic, but include datasets where the debate
was permeated by an intense political background
involving the Brazilian government.
Bolsonarism
includes datasets where the discussion was more related
to the nature of the Bolsonaro government. Other
includes two datasets related to a demonstration of
businesspeople demanding the opening of the country
and a crisis involving the Bolsonaro family.
Our methodology rendered 156 unique users after
merging the retweet and reply top 100 lists. Among
the first polarizers, nine accounts were not found during
the manual labeling process in Step 3 because they
were either banned or removed so that, in practice, we

Tweeter is the most common category and includes
users with no prominence outside Twitter, but that has
a high impact on this social network. One noticeable
characteristic is that most top-ranked tweeters belong to
the right. The political group category includes users
representing a group of people with great ideological
content but has no formal relation to any political party.
In contrast, Garimella and Weber [20] selected a shorter
list of 39 seed users among politicians and traditional
media from both left and right wings manually. In
the USA, traditional media is classified into left and
right, unlike our approach during the 2020 COVID-19
pandemic in Brazil.
Table 3 shows a sample with the top 10 retweet
polarizers2 , which is dominated by rightist tweeters. It
is fundamental to mention that the 5th user of RT Rank
is not present as this account was not available anymore.
Most users also appear in the reply rank.
On the other hand, the top 10 reply polarizer list
(not shown here) has more politicians and traditional
media. The right-wing is still the majority, but there
are two undefined and one left-wing. We found that
reply is a mechanism where discussions among different
user profiles happen, lead by politicians and traditional
media. Most top 10 users in the reply rank also appear
in the retweet rank.

1 A more detailed description of each dataset is provided in the
supplementary materials

2 The complete list of 147 polarizers can be found in the
supplementary material.
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Table 3: Sample of top 10 retweet polarizers

4.2.

presented a majority of retweets to left polarizers, i.e.,
Speech 1, Heleno, Business, and Queiroz, which leftists
mostly criticized the Brazilian government. Undefined
polarizers did not generate significant engagement for
polarizees, except for the Coronavirus dataset with 35%,
at the beginning of the pandemic.

Retweeting and Replying

For the 21 selected datasets, we compute the
retweet and reply behavior of the polarizees, i.e., when
polarizees retweet or reply polarizers. To understand
the representativeness of the polarizer group to measure
polarization, we counted the percentage of retweets and
replies targeted the polarizers in each dataset, depicted
by Figure 3. On average, polarizees retweeted and
replied to polarizers around 30% of the time. On
average, 70% of the retweets and replies targeted
non-polarizers, and this discovery leads us to expand the
polarizer group by automatically labeling polarizees as
left and right into the polarizer set. In some datasets,
polarizers received more than 40% of the retweets (i.e.,
Chloroquine, Supreme, Heleno, and Police) and more
than 40% of the replies (i.e., Speech 2, Speech 3, Video,
Impeachment, and Trench). We found out that the
higher the proportion of retweets and replies, the higher
the polarization.

Figure 4: Proportion of retweets to polarizers with
political leanings: left, right, and undefined
Right-wing polarizers engaged in a higher
proportion of polarizees also for replies, shown in
Figure 5, but with a less strong predominance for
most datasets. Moreover, there was an inversion
of proportionality between undefined and left in
the debated mediated by replies, where undefined
polarizers received the most replies for the Duarte and
Business datasets. The Duarte event derives from the
involvement of the ex-Secretary of Culture Regina
Duarte in an adverse situation during an interview with
CNN Brazil. In contrast, the business event attracted a
lower presence of polarizers and a higher presence of
journalists and traditional media. The higher proportion
of undefined polarizers in replies is a direct consequence
of the fact that the traditional media is more present in
discussions of ideas.

Figure 3: Proportion of retweets and replies to polarizers
Figure 4 shows the proportion of retweets and
replies from the polarizees to the polarizers according
to their political leaning: left, right, and undefined.
The first finding is that right-wing polarizers capture
most retweet and reply engagement. Rightists received
almost 100% in some datasets, namely Impeachment
and Trench, as demonstrated in Figure 4. Four datasets

Figure 5: Proportion of replies to polarizers with
political leanings: left, right, and undefined
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Figure 6 further highlights the predominance of
right polarizers in the debate, showing the Empirical
Cumulative Density Function (ECDF) for retweets in
the Police Dataset. According to the definition of
leaning in Step 5 of section 3, the ECDF shows that
around 45% of the polarizees of this dataset have leaning
0.5, which means that they did not retweet anyone,
retweeted only undefined polarizers, or retweeted both
sides the same number of times. Also, 40% of
the polarizees have leaning below 0.5, indicating a
polarization to the right. Only 15% have polarization
to the left with leaning above 0.5.
Figure 7: Retweet Polarization

Figure 6: ECDF of user retweet leaning - Police Dataset

4.3.

intense than the retweet polarization. The average for
all datasets is 0.49 for polarizees who replied ten or
more times and 0.36 for all polarizees. It also shares
a relationship with the proportion of replies going to
left, right, and undefined, shown by Figure 5. Again,
the reply polarization is lower due to the higher level
of discussion involving different sides, which is less
common in retweets. However, the standard deviation
of the reply polarization is higher compared to retweet.

Polarization Results

The average retweet polarization of all datasets is
0.62, considering polarizees who retweeted ten or more
times (shown in Figure 7), and 0.43 including all
polarizees (not shown). A first finding is the relationship
of retweeting behavior to political leanings (Figure
4) and the retweeting polarization (Figure 7). The
error bars show the standard deviation for the three
polarization charts.
A second finding is that the higher one of the sides
prevails among the others, the higher the polarization.
There is no direct relationship between the proportion of
retweets/replies to political leaning and the polarization
since the polarization of a dataset is computed as the
average polarization of its polarizees. The behavior of
polarizees may change considerably among datasets. In
other words, the retweeting polarization depends on the
mix of highly polarized and less polarized users. For
example, the highest retweeting polarization (0.78) was
achieved by the Police dataset, wherein around 80% of
the retweets targeted rightist polarizers. On the other
hand, the Trench dataset has 99% of retweets targeting
rightist polarizers but with a retweet polarization of
0.64. Undefined polarizers also influence the level of
polarization, even though they do not directly count for
the polarization. They consume retweets that could go
to either side otherwise, thus smoothing the polarization.
The reply polarization, shown by Figure 8, is less

Figure 8: Reply Polarization
Figure 9 shows the following polarization with an
average of 0.7 for all datasets, higher than for retweet
and reply. The standard deviation again reached a higher
level. Users are generally more polarized regarding
following other users, somewhat less polarized for
retweeting, and even less polarized for replying.
When analyzing a dataset in further detail, Figure
10 shows the number of retweets received by all users
(polarizers and polarizees) filtering by their polarization
for the Police dataset, which duly represents the other
20 datasets. The chart demonstrates that users within the
polarization range between 0.5 and 0.8 received around
50% of all retweets and that higher polarized users are
rarely retweeted. In contrast, results also indicate a
different user retweeting behavior, where most retweets,
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over the number of retweets and replies made by a
user, the users who cause a higher impact on others
(who are most frequently the polarizers) have a lower
polarization. This behavior might be counter-intuitive,
but it comes from the very nature of the metric.

Figure 9: Following Polarization
about 80%, come from users with polarization between
0.6 and 1, whereas almost 40% of all retweets come
from users with polarization 0.9 and higher.

Figure 10: Proportion of retweets received by users
according to the polarization metric - Police Dataset
Figure 11 depicts the effect of filtering a minimum
number of retweets and replies to compute the
polarization, from 0 to 50 for the Police dataset. We
filtered the dataset in four different ways, i.e., the
number of retweets sent (Retweets), number of retweets
received (retweeted), number of replies sent (Replies),
and number of replies received (replied). The figure
shows that the higher the number of times users retweet
and reply, the higher their polarization (with retweet
higher than reply according to previous results). The
average polarization of the dataset increases quickly
from 0.52 retweet and 0.39 reply to 0.80 and 0.69,
respectively, from zero to ten, and increases more
smoothly afterward. On the other hand, the higher
the number of times a user is retweeted and replied,
the lower their polarization. After filtering users
who retweeted and replied zero and one times, where
the polarization increases, it slowly decreases. The
explanation for this behavior is that polarizees very
prolific in retweeting/replying are highly polarized.
Contrarily, users who are frequently retweeted and
replied do not often retweet and reply to other users.
Consequently, as the polarization metric is computed

Figure 11: Effect of a minimum number of retweets and
replies to compute polarization - Police Dataset
Finally, we tried to understand our polarizers’
representativeness to compute the polarization metric,
even though they received, on average, less than
50% of the retweets and replies. By computing the
repolarization and including many polarizers, we found
out that polarizers correctly represent the datasets.
Table 4 demonstrates the effect of repolarization by
two automated approaches, automated 1 (i.e., one
repolarization iteration) and automated n (i.e., n
repolarization iterations). From the first 126 polarizers
with a definite leaning, most datasets considerably
increased this metric, e.g., Moro and Police. However,
this higher number of polarizers did not change the
polarization metric significantly. Most datasets had
a small increment of less than 1%, with the peak
for the Impeachment dataset with a 3.09% increase
from the manual (original) labeling to the automated
n approach. This result indicates that our approach
for selecting polarizers based on centrality metrics is
robust and representative of the datasets since adding
new polarizers did not change significantly.

5.

Discussion

The Brazilian political scenario has been increasing
in polarized opinions in the last few years but showed
a considerable rise during the 2020 pandemic. Our
research methodology and results revealed insights
from which significant lessons could be learned. Our
approach to analyzing conflicts makes it possible to
follow and understand Brazil and other countries’
political debate. Based on the literature and qualitative
analysis of our polarizers, we have the underlying
assumption that the higher the polarization of an event,
the higher the probability of this event representing a
conflict between sides competing to impose narratives.
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Table 4: Retweet repolarization Effect

Polarizers: The set of polarizers revealed the
polarization of our datasets.
It generated stable
polarization levels even though polarizers received, on
average, 30% of retweets and replies. Automated
repolarization using the polarization level to label
new polarizers did not present significant differences
from the original polarizer set. A low number of
highly influential users, the polarizers, can establish the
dynamics and ideological leaning of debates [10, 4].
Polarizer selection and labeling: Our methodology
requires a customized selection of polarizers, which
must be recalculated and tuned for different situations.
For example, as new datasets are added, new users
may achieve central positions, and old ones may be
less active, or even accounts may be banned or deleted.
Also, different subjects, not only politics, may involve
different sets of polarizers. The selection of polarizers
based on betweenness centrality is a CPU-intensive
process for large datasets. The good news is that the
attraction of retweets and replies mostly characterizes
polarizers, so that degree is an adequate predictor of
other centrality metrics. On the other hand, the polarizer
labeling is currently a manual process that must be
automated in the future, using different methods such
as sentiment analysis and machine learning.
Retweet, reply, and following polarization: The
number of times polarizees retweet and reply polarizers

revealed to be a correct predictor of their polarization,
rather than the frequency an original tweet is retweeted
and replied. This phenomenon happens due to the
nature of the polarization metric and the behavior of
polarizers and polarizees. Firstly, polarization is based
on the number of retweets and replies, which must be
repeated dozen times for the metric to yield high value.
On the other hand, polarizers are retweeted and replied
to many times, but they are not particularly prolific
in retweeting and replying. Users are generally more
polarized regarding following other users, less polarized
for retweeting, and even less for replying. In general, the
interaction patterns among users (follow, retweet, reply)
have a significant potential to identify their ideological
leaning within a conflict. Retweets are mostly used
for reinforcing a particular ideological view within the
so-called echo chambers. Replies are used to exchange
ideas within the same homogeneous group, but also
including users of opposing groups [10, 4, 15].
Role of users in online conflicts: In this new digital
society, the traditional media loses influence, giving way
to new actors, such as alternative media websites or
otherwise anonymous tweeters. In most event datasets,
most retweets and replies targeted rightist polarizers’
tweets. Only four out of 21 datasets presented a
prevalence of retweets to leftist polarizers and none to
undefined ones. As for replies, two datasets presented
the highest number to the undefined polarizers (mostly
traditional media) and none to the left. Traditional
media has a higher attraction on replies, used to debate
ideas among a more heterogeneous user base. In the
current highly polarized Brazilian political scenario,
most polarizers belong to the right, and most retweets
and replies go to rightist polarizers. The traditional
media was mostly labeled as undefined because the
current Brazilian political situation is so polarized that
small biases may be classified as neutral. The traditional
media is frequently blamed as the source of all evil and
accused of supporting the other side by both sides.
Action of bots: We found out that almost 40% of
all retweets come from users with polarization 0.9 and
higher who were not retweeted. This behavior may
indicate bots’ action as it is in line with previous works
on the topic [12, 13]; however, such analysis can be
recognized beyond the scope of this work and should
be considered as future work.
Applications: While the primary purpose of this
paper is to generate knowledge by shedding light on
polarized behaviors on Twitter, this understanding may
be used for practical applications as well. The two most
clear applications are in enhancing public policy and
preventing uncivil behavior in social media. Authorities
may use this methodology to understand polarized
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user behavior and improve the democratic processes
that shape our society. Social network providers may
also apply our methodology to improve surveillance
mechanisms on abusive users and build new online
services where respect and healthy discussions prevail.
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6.

Conclusion

We presented a polarization approach built on
descriptive measures of online conflicts on social
networks, i.e., following, retweet, and reply rates. A
multi-context case study during the 2020 Coronavirus
pandemic in Brazil showed that polarization levels are
higher in the following frequencies than retweet and
reply frequencies. Also, retweets support ideological
view within echo chambers, whereas replies are used to
exchange ideas. We demonstrated that our methodology
based on network centrality is feasible for selecting
polarizers, which are then utilized to compute the
polarization. From a practical perspective, we revealed
high polarization in Twitter-based political conflicts in
Brazil, which may have contributed to the ineffective
policies for combating the Coronavirus pandemic [21].
Future work will automatically identify bots and
remove them from the polarization metrics, as they can
increase the level of polarization [12], and influence
the disagreements on online conflicts [13]. Also, the
algorithmic labeling of polarizers is a crucial topic for
automating the identification of conflicts. Finally, a
discourse and network analysis should be carried out
to investigate if a high polarization reflects a high
probability of a conflict event between at least two sides
competing to impose their narratives.
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